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STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
FRANCIS MARIE MARCH,
Defendant-Appellant.

NO. 45992
Ada County Case No. CR01-16-35085

RESPONDENT’S BRIEF

Has March failed to show that the district court abused its sentencing discretion when it
sentenced her to life with 27 years determinate upon her conviction for first-degree murder?
ARGUMENT
March Has Failed Show That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing Discretion
A.

Introduction
Francis Marie March was a friend of Mark “Marco” Irwin, a man with mental health issues

and physical limitations. (PSI, pp. 3-4.) She had known Irwin for nearly 30 years. (PSI, pp. 4,
347.) Irwin used to let March park her motorhome on his property, and March “used to stay” at
Irwin’s house. (PSI, pp. 4, 347.) When Irwin’s sister could not get ahold of him for an extended
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period she contacted March, who told her that Irwin had talked of suicide and was engaged in
questionable activities. (PSI, pp. 4, 340, 342-43.) March also stated she had seen a mysterious
“yellow Hummer vehicle” at Irwin’s house near the time of his disappearance. (PSI, pp. 340, 343.)
In fact, March and her 20-year old boyfriend, Anthony Barclay, had murdered Irwin. (PSI,
p. 4.) Police caught March and Barclay pawning Irwin’s possessions, stolen from his home. (PSI,
pp. 4, 346.) March and Barclay tried to elude police, and when that failed March ran from the car
and tried to escape by jumping into the Boise River. (PSI, p. 346.) When interviewed, March
claimed that she had last seen Irwin earlier that month, and that he had kicked her out of his house.
(PSI, p. 347.) She admitted stealing some items from Irwin’s home when she was there to retrieve
her own property, and further admitted she had broken into Irwin’s house to steal property. (PSI,
p. 347.) Barclay also admitted breaking into Irwin’s house and also claimed he had last seen Irwin
alive, though his version of that event differed from March’s. (PSI, p. 348.) Police were able to
identify several items of Irwin’s property pawned by March and Barclay. (PSI, p. 348.) Additional
items of stolen property taken from Irwin were found in March and Barclay’s hotel room and car.
(PSI, pp. 352-53.) Also found were receipts for items like bleach, lye, a shovel, and instant
concrete. (PSI, pp. 353-54.)
Irwin’s decomposing body was found the next day wrapped in a tarp in a van parked at a
remote location. (PSI, pp. 4, 349-50.) Irwin’s body was so badly decomposed he had to be
identified by this dental records. (PSI, pp. 4, 6963.) An autopsy concluded Irwin’s death was
“consistent with asphyxiation due to air obstruction by a plastic bag.” (PSI, pp. 6958-59.) A
toxicology screen found amphetamine, THC, ethanol, Citalopram and Quetiapine. (PSI, p. 6958.)
Quetiapine is an “atypical antipsychotic” that could have rendered Irwin unconscious and could
have been fatal in high doses. (PSI, pp. 6229-31.)
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The state charged March with first-degree murder, failure to notify of a death, and
destruction of evidence. (R., pp. 31-32, 66-67.) The case was consolidated with three other felony
cases arising from the same events. (R., p. 51.)
March pled guilty to first-degree murder. (R., pp. 108-11.) As part of her plea she entered
a written factual basis for the plea. (R., pp. 103-04.) In the written factual basis she claimed no
intent to kill. (R., p. 103.) She admitted, however, “willfully and unlawfully” committing the
crime of “robbery and/or burglary that resulted in the unlawful killing” of Irwin. (R., pp. 103-04.)
She admitted drugging Irwin with Quetiapine “with the intent” of rendering him unconscious “to
accomplish a theft.” (R., p. 104.) She admitted “attempt[ing] to strike” Irwin’s head with “an
implement” to knock him unconscious. (R., p. 104.) She also admitted tying one end of a rope
used to strangle Irwin around a door handle, but denied doing so with intent to kill Irwin. (R., p.
104.)
March provided a statement to the pre-sentence investigator that amplified her factual
claims. (PSI, pp. 5-35, 66-147.) She stated that she and Barclay planned on robbing Irwin because
Irwin had been “mean” to them. (PSI, pp. 25-26.) She and Barclay drugged Irwin to render him
unconscious. (PSI, p. 26.) While Irwin was unconscious they “began to look for his keys.” (PSI,
p. 26.) They decided to move Irwin to the bedroom, but could not wake him so that he could walk
there so they physically moved him to his bed. (PSI, p. 27.) They found the keys in Irwin’s pants
pocket. (PSI, p. 27.) They used the keys to open two safes belonging to Irwin and removed the
property. (PSI, p. 27.) Irwin started moving and, fearing that he was regaining consciousness,
Barclay hit his head twice with a hatchet. (R., pp. 27-28.) March and Barclay continued gathering
the property they intended to steal. (PSI, p. 28.) When Irwin began moving again they tied him
up with his belt and some rope. (PSI, p. 28.) Barclay then tied a rope around Irwin’s neck and
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March tied the other end of the rope around the doorknob on the front door, which was “10 feet
away.” (PSI, p. 28.) According to March, Barclay wrapped Irwin’s corpse in tarps and bungee
cords. (PSI, p. 30.)
They drove to a dumpster and discarded the hatchet, bloody sheets and a pillowcase,
articles of clothing, and other items that indicated that Irwin was killed and tied them to the crime.
(PSI, pp. 30-31.) They then returned to Irwin’s house and stole guns and other items. (PSI, p. 31.)
March then drove Irwin’s van to Nampa to sell the guns. (PSI, p. 31.) She exchanged some of the
stolen property for methamphetamines. (PSI, p. 32.) March and Barclay sold silver coins they
had stolen for $2000. (PSI, p. 33.) Figuring they had to get Irwin’s corpse “out of the house in
the event someone dropped by,” they drove the van back to Irwin’s house and loaded the corpse
into the van. (PSI, p. 33.) They also removed more of Irwin’s property. (PSI, p. 33.) They sold
Irwin’s guitars and bought fast food. (PSI, p. 33.) They parked the van and left it for three days.
(PSI, p. 33.)
March, Barclay and another person bought lye to dissolve Irwin’s body and gas and
kerosene to burn it. (PSI, p. 34.) They tried to dig a hole where they could burn and dissolve the
body, but quit after getting only a few inches deep. (PSI, p. 34.) Instead they persuaded others to
dig the hole in exchange for a gun. (PSI, p. 35.) They ultimately did not recover the body to put
it in the hole. (PSI, p. 35.)
A psychological evaluation of March, prepared for sentencing, showed that the risk factors
that “seemed to contribute to the criminal offense” were March’s “personality disorder with
antisocial, borderline, narcissistic, and paranoid traits”; her “propensity” toward “negative
emotionality, poor emotional regulation, poor impulse control, poor insight, substance use issues,
[and] insufficient fear of consequences”; her tendencies to “associate with antisocial influences,”
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“be callous,” and “be manipulative”; and “evidence of pride in criminal behavior and sadistic
tendencies.” (PSI, p. 6547.) March was a “high risk to re-offend,” and such re-offense “could
include sadistic behavior, severe violence, mistreatment of children, drugs, alcohol, theft, or
burglary.” (PSI, p. 6547.) Her potential for a future criminal offense using manipulation or force
“seemed high.” (PSI, p. 6548.) Treatment in the form of medication and weekly psychotherapy
over the course of a year while incarcerated might reduce the risk. (PSI, pp. 6547-48.) However,
March was “less amenable for treatment than most offenders.” (PSI, p. 6548.) If March refused
treatment, or it failed, her “issues would continue, or become more severe,” making the threat to
the public “worse.” (PSI, p. 6548.)
At sentencing the district court applied its discretion and the relevant legal standards. (Tr.,
p. 111, L. 24 – p. 112, L. 11.) It had reviewed the materials presented. (Tr., p. 112, Ls. 12-24.)
The district court noted the seriousness of first-degree murder. (Tr., p. 112, L. 25 – p. 113, L. 4.)
In addressing March’s character the district court found that March “treated the victim as
if he wasn’t human,” “acted in a depraved, indifferent and, frankly, torturous way” when they “left
his body to rot … all the while trespassing again and again upon his home and stealing his
possessions.” (Tr., p. 113, Ls. 5-13.) March’s writings from jail showed, at best, indifference to
Irwin and no real remorse. (Tr., p. 113, L. 14 – p. 114, L. 16.) The district court found March to
be “a manipulative, self-indulgent narcissist” who cares for few other than herself, and that she
was “a highly manipulative person; cold, calculating, playing the odds and the angles to benefit
herself.” (Tr., p. 114, Ls. 17-24.) The district court noted that there was evidence suggesting
March, while in her 30s and 40s was “seducing teenage boys and living then a parasitic life, taking
advantage of anyone she can, seeing people not as people but as opportunities and targets.” (Tr.,
p. 114, L. 25 – p. 115, L. 13.)
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The district court rejected March’s attempts to characterize herself as “a mere innocent
bystander,” finding her “significantly more involved” in the murder than she claimed. (Tr., p. 115,
L. 14 – p. 116, L. 22.)
In pronouncing sentence the district court rejected the state’s “appropriate”
recommendation of a fixed life sentence out of “mercy,” but found a “lengthy sentence, at a
minimum, is necessary to protect the community.” (Tr., p. 117, L. 22 – p. 118, L. 14.) The district
court also found that a lengthy sentence was “also necessary for general deterrence,” and that
rehabilitation was not a “realistic goal in the near term.” (Tr., p. 118, Ls. 14-21.) Finally, the
nature of the crime called for punishment. (Tr., p. 118, L. 22 – p. 119, L. 5.)
The district court thereupon imposed a sentence of life with 27 years determinate. (Tr., p.
119, Ls. 6-12.) The district court also imposed a fine of $10,000 and a victim payment of $5,000.
(Tr., p. 119, Ls. 20-23.) March filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., pp. 172-74.)
On appeal March argues the district court abused its discretion because the sentence is
“longer than needed to protect society” (Appellant’s brief, pp. 7-8), and does not achieve other
goals of sentencing (Appellant’s brief, pp. 9-10). March’s opinion that a lesser sentence would
fulfill the goals of sentencing does not show that her sentence is excessive under any reasonable
view of the facts.

B.

Standard Of Review
The length of a sentence is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard considering the

defendant’s entire sentence. State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007) (citing
State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460, 50 P.3d 472, 475 (2002); State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201,
159 P.3d 838 (2007)). It is presumed that the fixed portion of the sentence will be the defendant's
probable term of confinement. Id. (citing State v. Trevino, 132 Idaho 888, 980 P.2d 552 (1999)).
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Where a sentence is within statutory limits, the appellant bears the burden of demonstrating that it
is a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Baker, 136 Idaho 576, 577, 38 P.3d 614, 615 (2001) (citing
State v. Lundquist, 134 Idaho 831, 11 P.3d 27 (2000)).
When considering whether the sentence was an abuse of discretion, “this Court
considers: (1) whether the trial court correctly perceived the issue as one of
discretion; (2) whether the trial court acted within the boundaries of its discretion
and consistently with the legal standards applicable; and (3) whether the trial court
reached its decision by an exercise of reason.”
State v. Fisher, 162 Idaho 465, 398 P.3d 839, 842 (2017) (quoting State v. Miller, 151 Idaho 828,
834, 264 P.3d 935, 941 (2011)).

C.

March Has Shown No Abuse Of The District Court’s Discretion
To bear the burden of demonstrating an abuse of discretion, the appellant must establish

that, under any reasonable view of the facts, the sentence was excessive. State v. Farwell, 144
Idaho 732, 736, 170 P.3d 397, 401 (2007). In determining whether the appellant met his burden,
the court considers the entire sentence but, because the decision to release him on parole is
exclusively the province of the executive branch, presumes that the determinate portion will be the
period of actual incarceration. State v. Bailey, 161 Idaho 887, 895, 392 P.3d 1228, 1236 (2017)
(citing Oliver, 144 Idaho at 726, 170 P.3d at 391). To establish that the sentence was excessive,
he must demonstrate that reasonable minds could not conclude the sentence was appropriate to
accomplish the sentencing goals of protecting society, deterrence, rehabilitation, and retribution.
Farwell, 144 Idaho at 736, 170 P.3d at 401. A sentence is reasonable “‘if it appears necessary to
accomplish the primary objective of protecting society and to achieve any or all of the related goals
of deterrence, rehabilitation, or retribution.’” Bailey, 161 Idaho at 895–96, 392 P.3d at 1236–37
(quoting State v. McIntosh, 160 Idaho 1, 8, 368 P.3d 621, 628 (2015)).
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The district court’s conclusions that a sentence of life with 27 years determinate was
necessary to accomplish the primary goals of sentencing was a reasonable view of the facts. As
found by the district court, March committed a heinous crime; minimized her role in that crime
while shifting blame to others, including the victim; lacked remorse and rehabilitative potential;
and avoided a fixed life sentence only as an act of mercy. (Tr., p. 111, L. 24 – p. 119, L. 12.) The
district court’s factual findings, unchallenged on appeal, support the sentence imposed.
March first argues unironically that the sentence is longer than necessary to protect the
community because of her age. Specifically, he argues that because she is in her mid-forties (as
opposed to a defendant in her twenties) she will be released on parole with a life expectancy of
seven years. (Appellant’s brief, p. 7.) Thus, her sentence is “nearly indistinguishable from a fixed
life sentence” and should be scrutinized “more closely than the usual case.” (Appellant’s brief, p.
7.) March’s claim that she should receive a different standard of review than would a younger
defendant is baseless. There is nothing in this record indicating the district court imposed the 27year fixed term as a hedge against uncertainty, or with intent that March not live to see parole. Her
argument for a different standard of review based on being middle aged is meritless.
Sticking with the age-related theme, March also argues that criminality tends to decrease
with age, and that the district court should have accepted Dr. Beaver’s conclusion that March
would be a low risk to reoffend in 10 to 15 years. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 7-8.) Even accepting
this general statistic that recidivism declines in later years, it shows no clear error in the district
court’s finding that March’s rehabilitation was not a “realistic goal in the near term.” (Tr., p. 118,
Ls. 14-21.) Nor does it show any abuse of discretion in concluding that community protection
demanded a sentence with 27 years determinate given the seriousness of the offense and the
callousness with which it was committed.

Although March’s age was an appropriate
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consideration, middle-aged murderers are not automatically entitled to lesser sentences. March’s
argument shows no abuse of discretion.
March also argues the sentence was longer than needed to achieve the other goals of
sentencing as well, pointing out her relative lack of a criminal record, her age, and claiming that
longer sentences lack deterrent effect. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 9-10.) Despite March’s argument,
general deterrence remains a legal factor to consider in sentencing. March has failed to show that
the district court’s consideration of general deterrence was an abuse of discretion. Likewise,
March’s disagreement with the conclusions drawn from the trial court’s factual findings, which he
does not claim (much less show) were clear error, does not establish an abuse of discretion.
March committed a heinous crime, showed no remorse, and is and will continue to be a
threat to society. She has shown no abuse of discretion in the district court’s sentence.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the judgment of the district court.
DATED this 23rd day of January, 2019.

__/s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen_________________
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 23rd day of January, 2019, served a true and correct copy of
the attached RESPONDENT’S BRIEF to the attorney listed below by means of iCourt File and Serve:
DENNIS BENJAMIN
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP
db@nbmlaw.com

__/s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen_________________
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